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ABSTRACT 
Commercialisation is the product of a government deciding to 
address the perceived inadequate performance of public agencies by 
forcing civil servants to pursue a results-oriented approach to their 
management using business principles and practices . Its 
implementation brings into focus a variety of policy issues that 
governments must address. Moreover, effective commercialisation of 
a public agency requires the adoption of a commercial framework that 
then sets the context for the necessary structural, cultural and 
procedural changes. To implement such changes requires on-going 
political commitment and adroit senior executive civil servants. 
Effective commercialisation is , above all, the outcome of an 
incremental organisational development process that seeks to find a 
balance amongst the often-competing values and affiliations of 
commercialising public agency's diverse array of stakeholders, and so 
ensures that commercial activities becorne an appropriate and accepted 
feature of organisational life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One proffered solution to the public sector' s self-evidently inadequate 
performance is to inculcate market into public agencies, so that civil servants are 
forced to pursue a results-oriented approach to their management using business 
principles and practices (see Dixon, 1995). This view now pervades public 
administration in, most notably, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
Canada and the United States) (Caiden, 1994; Dixon, 1988 & 1996; Dixon & 
Kouzmin, 1994a, 1994b & 1995; Ingraham & Peters, 1988; Kouzmin, Dixon & 
Wilson, 1995; Lane, 1985; Mascarenhas, 1993; Peters, 1994; Pollitt, 1990). It is 
underscored by a neo-conservative ideology that asserts that the public sector 
needs, where ever possible, the discipline of market forces to constrain rent-
seeking behaviour by bureaucrats, their c1ients and the po1iticians who govern 
them. 
Commercialisation is the product of a government deciding inculcate 
market forces into its civil service. This first requires governrnent to de-couple 
its policy advising and regulatory functions from its service delivery functions , 
w hich then allows pub1ic agencies to identify those budget-funded core and 
incidental functions that produce goods and services for which markets could be 
identified and charges (reimbursements) could be imposed. The end-users may 
either be external to the civil service or they may be other public agencies. 
The purpose of this paper is to set out the agenda that a government, in 
co叫unction with public agencies, must address if there is to be an effective 
commercialisation of appropriate government activities.1 
THE COMMERCIALISA TION PROCESS 
1 This agenda is much the same as that confronted by post- and pseudo socialist countries seeking to 
reform their state sectors. 
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"Commercialisation" describes two sequential but inter-related processes. 
The first involves "marketisation", the creation of either monopoly, contestable, 
or competitive markets for the goods and services produced by public agencies. 
The second focuses on how public agencies must be re-engineered (Coulson-
Thomas, 1993), so as to adapt their orga叫sational structures and processes to meet 
the marketisation challenges. 
THE SEARCH FOR COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES 
、VITHIN PUBLIC AGENCIES 
Public agencies searching for activities suitable for commercialisation, need 
to consider a variety of questions . What would be the costs and expected benef~ts 
of the commercial activity? Who would be the end-users? What would be the 
impact on the service user? What are public interest issues to be considered (such 
as ethical and moral dimensions, political responsiveness and community 
participation)? Would a commercial activity interfere with the public agency' s 
core business? Does the agency have the necessary mix of skills needed to run a 
commercial activity? Are there clear performance measurement and reporting 
mechanisms in place within the agency? 
The decision by government whether or not to commercialise any public 
agency activity should be based on the following considerations. Is the product to 
be commercialised is saleable? Is it integral to core agency functions? Should the 
government keep control over the product or its market? Will 
commercialisation enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency's non-
commercial functions? Are there resources available that are under-utilised 
from time-to-time , due , say, to cyclical workloads or technology? Is 
commercialisation financially viable (in the short-term, can the agency recover 
an acceptable proportion of its recurrent costs; in the longer term, can it generate 
an acceptable real rate of return on funds invested)? 
THE COMMERCIALISA TION POLICY AGENDA 
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The implementation of a civil service commercialisation strategy brings 
into focus a variety of policy issues that governrnents must address. 
User Charging 
Government must decide whether the principle of user charging 
(reimbursement) by public agencies should be applied to the provision of 
particular goods and services to external end-users or to other public agencies . 
This involves a complex set of policy issues. These revolve around the 
desirability of using the market mechanism as a means of determining the 
utilisation and quality of publicly provided goods and services and the 
conceptualisa tion of the "public interest" dimensions of any such public 
provision, especially political responsiveness, desired social justice outcomes and 
the perceived economic and social benefits to the community. The imposition of 
inter-agency charging for common government services, traditionally provided 
by a central supply agency without reimbursement, is intended to make end-user 
agencies more aware of their cost, thereby removing a tendency towards a 'free 
good' attitude to their use, by giving them greater management flexibility in 
choosing their supply options, in the hope of increasing the economy and 
efficiency not only of the end-user agencies but also the central supply agencies . 
Budget Supplementation 
The decision to impose inter-agency charging for common government 
services previously budget-funded through a central supply agency involves 
concomitant decisions about end-user budget supplementation. The issue is 
whether, to what extent and upon what basis government should transfer the 
previous budget allocation for central-agency provision to end-user agencies. The 
policy issue for government is to determine the degree of supplementation that 
should be provided, for it is in the interests of both the end-user and the central 
supply agencies to gain full supplementation, regardless of the potential efficiency 
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gains projected. It a1so raises the issue of whether, as part of the deregu1ation 
process, end-user agencies shou1d be given some influence, even discretion, over 
the 1eve1 and quality of a centra1 supp1y agency's provision of such goods and 
servlces. 
Revenue Retention 
Revenue retention is a key issue for commercialising public agencies, for it 
offers a financia1 incentive that encourages increased efficiency and cost 
reductions . Undoubted1y, however, revenue retention creates a dilemma for 
both government and for those agencies. 
For government, allowing a pub1ic agencies to retain their net commercia1 
(extra-budgetary) revenue reduces budgetary contro1 over public provision, 
especially where that agency's core function is being commercialised. It a1so 
reduces the government's flexibility to cross-subsidise pàrticu1ar end users or 
particu1ar public1y-provided goods and services, in order to meet public policy 
objectives. From a public agency' s perspective, the retention of revenue by a 
constituent administrative unit with a commercia1 orientation but with 
primari1y non-commercia1 goa1s can create incentives that may distract it from 
the achievement of those primary goa1s. 
Central Supply Deregulation 
The deregu1ation of the provision of budget-funded, centrally-provided 
common government services gives to individua1 end-user agencies the 
responsibilities for the acquisition of those goods and services, whether by way of 
contracting out to a centra1 supp1y agency, by managing in-house supp1y or by 
contracting out to the private sector. This gives rise to a set of thorny policy 
issues re1ating to the appropriate degree of contro1 that the centra1 contro1 
agencies shou1d have over end-user agency supp1y options (notab1y contracting-
out or in-house production decisions) and over centra1 supp1y agencies. 
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Political Oversight, Intervention, Control and Accountability 
The decision by government to commercialise a particular budget-funded 
activity implies the desirability of the goods and services produced being sold 
within the rigours and rigidities of an extant set of politico-administrative 
procedures and practices. Thus commercialised activities are not beyond 
government responsibility and hence direct political accountability and, 
potentially, control. Their degree of operational independence is a matter of 
government discretion. Any weakening of the degree of government authority 
over an agency's commercial activities raised important issues of government 
accountability. As there is a fundamental connection between control over 
decision-making and accountability, the key issue is how far a government can 
(or should) be held responsible for the conduct (or misconduct) of a public 
agency's commercial activity. A balance must clearly be achieved between the 
need for a commercialising agency to be able to pursue commercial goals and the 
government's need to ensure appropriate accountability, especially where the 
goods and services are provided through a public monopoly, thus generating a 
potential for monopoly rent. 
Commercialisation creates new politico-managerial situation; one that 
requires a re-defining of the prevailing accountability framework (Dixon, 
Kouzmin & Korac-Kakabadse, 1996). An appropriate accountability framework 
would need, at very least, to involve the government in reviewing and 
approving business mission statements; reviewing and approving business 
plans; reviewing annual estimates, the annual report and financial statements; 
reviewing performance against business plans; giving directions in relation to 
desirable and undesirable connections with the private sector, avoidance of 
conflicts of interest, expectations regarding advice to the government about the 
activities of any external review bodies, and expectations regarding the advice 
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that should be tendered on matter expected either to give rise to media coverage 
or to come to the attention of the legislature. 
Accessing Private 此farkets
The charging of a fee (or seeking reimbursement) for the provision of goods 
and services to external end-users involves the political acceptance of the 
principal that a public agency should be allowed to compete with the private 
sector in the market place. The dilemma for government is that sanctioning such 
competition may solicit accusations from private sector competitors that public 
agencies would have an unfair competitive advantage because they do not 
(indeed even cannot) operate on a fu11 cost basis, prefering to ignore, of course, 
the myriad of rules and regulations that constrain and hamper the conduct of a 
commercial activity by a public agency. For a commercialising central supply 
agency operating in a deregulated civil service market environment, the 
dilemma is that if it is unable to compete with the private sector for market share 
in other markets, while the private sector is able to compete with it for civil 
service market share, the result may be decline in its financial viability due to a 
shrinking its end-user-base that increases its average fixed costs and thus its 
break-even prices . 
Community Service Obligations 
Community service obligations include a11 requests by the government for 
action to be performed (or not performed) in the circumstances that are not in the 
11 commercial interest" of a commercialising public agency. The questions begged 
by this definition, however, is how and by whom should 11 commercial interest" 
be defined. The specific articulation by government of what a commercialising 
public agency's community service obligations are, and how they should be 
accommodated, is fraught with difficulties, for they reflect, in general, a 
government's societal (natural and social justice) objectives . Yet the existence of 
unaccommodated community service obligations blurrs public accountability, by 
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com plica ting the conceptualisa tion of 11 efficiency" and 11 effecti veness". 
Government must, then, determine, on a case-by-case basis, how it can best 
accommodate community service obligations. 
COMMERCIALISA TION: A QUASI-BUSINESS FORMA TION PROCESS 
Enabling public agencies to conduct commercial activities involves a quasi-
business formation process by which, to vary degrees, in varying sequences, and 
over varying periods of time, a basic business framework is established and a 
range of the concomitant structural, cultural and practice-procedural issues are 
addressed. Essentially this process must give the commercialising agency the 
capacity to scan its markets, to determine the level and nature of the demand for 
its commercialised goods and services; and to respond to that demand, by 
effectively addressing and meeting end-user needs in way that is financially and 
organisationally acceptable to its external and internal stakeholders. 
The Business Framework 
A commercialising public agency must establish a set of financial, market, 
administrative , accountability and external control frameworks that are 
acceptable to the commercialising agency's stakeholders, especially government 
and the central control and review agencies. This involves establishing an 
appropriate set of business ground rules. 
Financial Framework. An appropriate financial framework for the 
commercialisation of an agency's core activities might be the formation of one or 
more Trust Accounts may be an option. In the event of multiple core activities 
being commercialised within an agency a decision must be made as to whether 
one omnibus Trust Fund or a set of Trust Funds should be created. The former 
option facilitates cross-subsidisation amongst commercial activities within the 
Trust Fund and allows better cash management. When core activities are to be 
commercialised gradually or when a goods and services incidental to the core 
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budget-funded activities, it may be more appropriate to deem any revenue 
derived from the sale of appropriate goods or services to have been appropriated. 
The creating the necessary capital (or funding) framework involves 
identifying and agreeing upon the cost of any assets to be transfered to the 
commercialising agency; setting levels and basis of repaying any budget-funded 
establishment grants (including capital and any contingency grants), operating 
subsidies and working capital loans required to meet expected working capital 
deficits (in the light of any projected cash-flow shortfalls), with loans perhaps 
expected, to be budget-neutral and to attract a specific rate of interest, perhaps 
- equivalent to the long-term bond rate; agreeing on the treatment of accrued 
liabilities (such as accrued long service, sickness and recreation leave); agreeing 
on how additional capital funds will be financed (from retained revenue, from 
annual budget-funded grants and loans, or even from private capital market 
sources); setting appropriate target real and nominal rate of return on funds 
invested (if any); setting acceptable level of revenue retention; deciding on any 
supplementary funding for , say, insurance costs, where the insurance risk was 
previously carried by government, for one-off staff redundancy costs, or for pre-
determined future wage rises; determining the funding of any community 
service obligations; and deciding on what (if any) taxes and charges should be 
paid. 
Market Framework. For central agency suppliers of common government 
services this involves the creation of a civi1 service regulated monopoly market, 
with a negotiated target deregulation date , so as to introduce a degree of 
contestability and, ultimately, competition into the provision of such services. 
Accountability Framework. In the context of the articulated accountability 
requirements, the .i .commercia1isation: quasi-business development process : 
commercial framework: accountability framework; nature and periodicity of the 
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performance information needs of the government, the Legislature and the 
central control and any review agencies have to be identifies and me t. This 
would include financial management performance indicators (such as net 
operating profit, gross sales, sales per employee, net profit as a percentage of sales, 
return on total assets, return on net assets and total cost per employee); market 
management performance indicators (such as market share, customer satisfaction 
and customer complaints); production process performance indicators (such as 
productivity and community service obligations); and human resource 
management performance indicators (such as industrial disputation, 
occupational health and safety and equal employment opportunity). 
Central Agency Control Framework. The appropriate roles of a variety of central 
control agencies have to be negotiated. Specifically, the roles of the agency 
responsible for financial administration, with respect to financial reporting and 
accounting practices and for personnel administration, with respect to staff 
classification structures, pay and conditions, labour relations, recruitment and 
promohon 
These commercial frameworks define the setting within which the 
structural, cultural and practice-procedural dimensions of the quasi-business 
formulation process are determined and implemented. 
Structural Dimensions 
The effective commercialisation of a previously budget-funded activity 
demands a review and perhaps a re-casting of the host agency's structure to 
ensure that it is aligned with its commercialisation goals. The nature of any 
structural changes required, particularly the desirability of creating one or more 
commercial units within an agency, depends upon the extent to which the 
commercialising activities have primarily commercial goals and whether they 
face of actual (or potential) competitive pressures. An agency commercialising in 
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a monopoly market environment activities that have primarily non-commercial 
goals confronts the challenge of designing a structure that while acknowledging 
the primacy of the non-commercial goals, particularly in terms of product design, 
facilitates marketing and distribution to fee-paying end-users . In contrast, an 
agency commercialising in a contestable or competitive market environment 
activities that have primarily commercial goals confront the need to design a 
structure that facilitates the adoption of a spectrum of commercially-oriented 
practices (including marketing and financial management practices) and the 
building of a commercial culture (Mascarenhas, 1993), without detriment to any 
remaining non-commercial activities of the agency. Depending on market 
features and conditions, this may well create a need to establish one or more 
commercial unit within the agency, each having an organisational structure 
which is vertically flatter (so that production process, especially problem-solving, 
decisions can be made at points that are closer to the end-user, so as to reduce 
market-sensitive decision response times, to simplify co-ordination and to reduce 
communication distortions); less formalised (to give staff more discretion in 
satisfying idiosyncratic end-user needs); and more complex horizontally, even 
one with a significant degree of spatial differentiation (to give staff a competitive 
advantage in being closer to their end-users). The challenge is to ensure sub-
system congruence (Shareef, 1994), which means that these differentiated 
structures cannot be allowed to become closed systems serving self-serving vested 
interests (Jones, 1991) 
Cu1tural Dimensions 
Commercialisation requires the inculcation of an organisational culture that 
supports commercially-oriented values and attitudes. Any changing of a public 
agency' s ideals, norms and values in order to inculcate such a commercial culture 
may gìves rise to a potential culture conflict, the existence of which reflects the 
existence of resistance to change by those who, when their past is threatened, are 
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frightened of loosing whatever it was they valued in the old culture, perhaps 
even their own sense of self-esteem. Culture conflict must be managed (Brown, 
1992) by those who are sensitive to the symbolic dimensions of their 
management roles (Gunner, 1990) and who are capable of promoting, protecting 
and propagating the commercial culture-forming values (Sutton & Nelson, 1990). 
Culture conflict must be broken down by reason rather than by coercion (Karp, 
1988). Anthony (1990) has observed, soberingly, that management-imposed 
organisational belief systems, values and meanings have rarely been transmitted, 
successfully, to those whose behaviour are targeted for change, which has the 
effect of organisationally isolating managers, who become locked into a 
commitment to values that are not shared and who become cocooned within the 
safety of their contrived organisational world view. 
How to achieve the required culture change is a challenge confronting all 
commercialising agencies. One approach that is relevant to the 
commercialisa tion of an agency' core activi ties is to adopted a 11 cultural 
revolution" strategy (Gangliardi, 1986), which is designed to develop an 
organisational socialisation (learning) process (Ostroff & Kozlowski, 1992) that 
would induct all its employees into the desired commercial culture, with the 
intent of making it dominant. In implementing this cultural revolution, an 
agency has to ensure that its commercial goals are clearly articulated, so that staff 
focus is centred on those positive dimensions of commercial reform that are 
compatible with the existing culture (such as improving end-user service and 
creating new career opportunities) rather than the negative dimensions (such as 
cost cutting and the spectre of staff redundancies), so as to avoid a debilitating 
culture clash, although clash of existing staff perceptions and the envisioned 
commercial culture can be motivating. 
Where an agency is commercia1ising some but not all of its important core 
activities, the possibility that by the inculcation a commercial sub-culture, one 
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that by reflecting the common problems, situations and experiences faced by a 
significant number of employees operating in a market environment, may only 
give lip service to core values of the once-dominant culture. This may produce 
commercially dysfunctional culture conflicts (Gregory, 1983), an even a more 
destructive sub-culture warfare or perhaps sub-culture elitism, under which the 
agency' s commercial activities becomes exclusive clubs, with restricted entry and 
with values that are perceived to be more important that those of the agency. 
Agencies commercialising only incidental activities, especially those with a 
commercially dysfunctional dominant culture (as is the situation in policy-
oriented public agencies), face the additional conundrum of how to create a sub-
culture that is conducive to commercialisation and yet able to co-exist with a 
dominant culture that may perceive it as a threatening heresy. 
ProceduralDimensions. 
In the context of the envisaged business framework, commercialising public 
agencies confront the dilemma of how to develop and implement practices and 
procedures that will make them more business oriented, the essence of which is 
rnarket-driven strategic planning, implementation and control , within 
constraints imposed by civil service-wide procedures, practices and guidelines, 
which are intended to achieving different planning, implementation and control 
outcomes. 
Strategic, Corporate and Business Planning. A commercialising public agency 
context must develop appropriate plans, based upon its comrnercial mission as 
determined with the governrnent. In doing so it must draw upon a shared 
organisational vision to generate a set of accepted commercial objectives, which 
rnust have a specified time-frarne and be mutually consistent, attainable and 
measurable. This set of objectives provide the basis for a concomitant set of 
agreed corporate, business and operational plans. Together, these map out what 
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the agency hopes to achieve by fulfilling its commercial mission and how it 
intends to go about doing so. 
The planning process also requires the establishing of subsidiary functional 
objectives with respect to financial returns, productivity growth, human 
resources (in the light of prevailing civil service-wide personnel practices and 
procedures), customer service (in terms of benchmarked standards), market 
performance, market research and product development, physical resources (in 
terms of fixed asset retention, fixed asset disposal, maintenance and depreciation), 
and community service obligations. 
The corporate plan constitutes the commercialising public agency's 
corporate grand design. It determine how its commercial objectives are going to 
be achieved within the prevailing and future market environment and within 
the context of the extant political guidelines and constraints. It reflects how the it 
intends to change (by means of future product substitution or diversification, 
market expansion or contraction, or market and/or product specialisation) and 
how such changes are to be resourced, implemented and evaluated. It identifies 
the perceived business risks that are likely to be confronted and elaborates on 
how they might best be managed. 
The business plan flows from the corporate plan and focuses on how 
commercialising agency is going to address the current and future opportunities 
and threats generated by actual competitive pressures (if its commercial activities 
are to be conducted in a competitive market), or by the threat of competition (if 
the commercial activity is conducted in a contestable monopoly market). 
Operational strategies are needed to support chosen strategic, corporate and 
business strategies and relate to the functional areas of the commercial activity. 
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Product Delivery Strategies. A set of end-user-driven product delivery practices 
and procedures are needed in order to increase end-user influence, even control, 
over both the quantity and quality of goods and services provided. This involves 
instituting a continuous improvement process (Bush & Dooley, 1992). 
Financial Managemen t. Reliable and accurate financial information systems, 
with attendant budgeting, internal controls and accounting practices and 
procedures, is necessary not only for the effective management of a public 
agency's commercial activities but also to satisfy public accountability 
requirements. Budgeting practices and procedures must enable the generation of 
cash-flow, revenue and expenditure, and capital budgets. Cost accounting 
procedures are needed to ensure that pricing decisions are based on accurate and 
reliable costings and that budgeted expenditure, purchasing and production costs 
variations are monitored. Cash, invoicing and debt management procedures are 
needed to ensure that adequate controls exist to satisfy probity requirements, to 
ensure that cash held is adequate but not in excess of requirements, and to 
minimise the risk of fraud. Invoicing procedures need to be established to ensure 
that accurate and timely invoices are generated. A debtors system must be able to 
provide timely and accurate information on accounts receivable (and their aging). 
Accounts payable procedures and policies must ensure that debts are paid on an 
acceptable basis. Asset valuing and recording procedures are needed to ensure 
that the assets entrusted to the organisation are safeguarded. Risk management 
procedures must facilitate the conduct of periodic risk audits and concomitant 
regular risk monitoring, in order to facilitate the development of appropriate 
policies with respect to risk elimination, risk control and risk financing. 
Human Resource Managemen t. Two strategically important human resource 
management issues confront commercialising agencies in their infancy: the 
employment of commercially experienced staff and the preparation of staff for the 
required organisational culture shift. Central to the success of commercialisation 
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is the development of a set human resource management practices and 
procedures that enable effective management of public agency commercial 
actìvìhes. 
Human resource planning practices and procedures are needed to forecast the 
short-term and long-term human resource needs of the commercial activities, in 
the context of its corporate strategies, and the steps necessary to meet those needs 
(see, for example, Sa1iba, 1993). Recruitment, selection and promotion practices 
and procedures would have to strengthened the principle of merit recruitment 
and promotion. Performance appraisal procedures would need to be designed so 
as not to encourage zero-sum competition, not to destroy morale and not to 
inhibit motivation. Practices and procedures are needed to deal effectively with 
staff who evidence poor performance. Redundancy procedures are needed to 
facilitate any organisational down-sizing required. Performance pay procedures 
are needed to ensure that staff are motivated to achieve the corporate commercial 
mission without jeopardising team work, undermining morale or generating 
resentment. Human resource development practices and procedures are needed 
to improve current and future work performance. 
Market Management. Because pub1ic agency's commercial activities operate 
within a market setting, they requires the capacity to undertake the strategic 
scanning of the market environment, which requires instituting systems to 
gather market data that allows the monitoring of marketing performance against 
predetermined performance standards or benchmarks and to gather market 
intelligence that allows the timely identification of possible, probable or likely 
market threats and opportunities 
Strategic Monitoring and Control. Strategic monitoring and control requires the 
design of a set of performance indices including financial management 
performance indicators (such as net operating profit, gross sales, sales per 
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employee, net profit as a percentage of sales, return on net assets, and total cost 
per employee); market management performance indicators (such as product 
sales, market share, cost of sales, customer satisfaction and customer complaints); 
service delivery performance indicators (such as productivity, product quality, 
product developments and community service obligations); and human resource 
management performance indicators (such as staff turnover, job satisfaction, 
absenteeism, industrial disputation, occupational health and safety, and equal 
employment opportunity). 
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CO扎f此1ERCIALISATION: 
THE ORGANISA TIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Commercialisation pressures create a need for a unique set of organisational 
changes within commercialising public agencies that would bring them into a 
more congruent "strategic fit". This means aligning their strategies, culture and 
leadership style to their competitive situation (Chorn, 1991). This requires a 
commercialising public agency to become more entrepreneurial, whilst 
maintaining its organisational integrity and protecting its extant professional and 
technical standards; and to "manage by anticipation" (Chartier, 1985: 177) the 
organisational and behavioural change~ needed to achieve the desired level of 
commercial performance given the permitted degree of market orientation. 
Commercialising public agencies must create what Gilmore and Barnett 
(1992: 535) metaphorically describe as "social architecture", the "scaffolding that 
can support the necessary thinking that could result in structural change". This 
requires the adoption of intervention strategies that allow staff to continue to 
undertake, 的 competently as possible, organisationally-essential tasks, and so 
reduce any perceived risk, while at the same time faci1itating cultural change. A 
multi-facited organisational development process must be initiated, one 
involving the articulation of an organisational change goal statement embracing 
increased commercial effectiveness at the micro-level (such as, better product 
quality, greater value for money and lower costs); the specification of the likely 
impact (both directional and degree) of commercialisation; the development of a 
commercialisation implementation plan based on a widely-shared diagnosis of 
the likely reactions of those responsible for its implementation, or of those 
affected by commercialisation; the implementation of commercialisation 
strategies and tactics; and the monitoring of the impact and the success of the 
implementing of those strategies and tactics, so as to determine whether and 
when adjustments to them are needed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The effective commercialisation of a public agency requires an on-going 
political commitment so that any resistance to change within that agency and 
within the civil service as a whole can be broken down. It also require adroit 
senior executive civil servants who are capable of managing the ambiguities of 
commercialisation. This means that they have a commitment to the values of 
commercialisa tion (by re-aligning their personal goals and by making any 
requisite personal changes); a desire to achieve successful organisational goal re-
alignment (to ensure that commercialisation reform is accepted and 
institutionalised by means of cultural, structural and procedural change); the 
ability to identify how they can best maintain, in the face of change, the agency' s 
organisational integrity and its professional or technical standards of task 
performance; and the ability to make the structural and procedural changes 
needed and to communicate with their staff about the precise nature of the 
commercialisation reform proposals, their likely organisational impacts, the 
extent of organisational change envisaged, the personal behaviour changes 
required, and support tha t will be provided to those gra ppling with their own and 
others' behaviour change. 
Effective commercialisation is, above all, the outcome of an incremental 
organisational development process that, of necessity, iteratively seeks to find a 
balance amongst the often-competing values and affiliations of commercialising 
agency's diverse array of stakeholders, and so ensures that commercial activities 
become an appropriate and accepted feature of organisationallife. 
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